A unique Finnish household-level data from 1994 to 2009 allow us to measure how households' …nancial expectations are related to the subsequent outcomes. We use the di¤erence between the two to measure forecast errors and household optimism and link the errors to households' borrowing behaviour. We …nd that households making greatest optimistic forecast errors carry greater levels of debt and are most likely to su¤er from excessive debt loads (overindebtedness). They also are less attentive to forecast errors than their pessimistic counterparts when forming their expectations for a subsequent period.
Introduction
It is often argued that people are -at least in certain decision-making contexts -prone to make forecast errors that are consistent with them holding (overly) optimistic expectations. 1 There are, however, only relatively few studies that measure forecast errors using deviations of subjective expectations from actual realizations and that, in particular, study the behavioral consequences and sources of such forecast errors and optimism. Two important exceptions are Souleles (2004) and Puri and Robinson (2007) . 2 Souleles This paper builds on these analyses and explores speci…cally the notion that (larger) optimistic forecast errors are associated with sub-optimal decisionmaking: Does the notion generalize to other, non-U.S. institutional environments and decision-making contexts? In particular, does it apply to household borrowing behaviour? 3 These questions await for an answer, as it has been 1 See, e.g., Puri and Robinson (2007) and the literature cited therein. There are three types of overcon…dence (Moore and Healy 2008): Overestimation, which refers to a miscalibrated forecast relative to the objective likelihood of an event; overplacement, which results in the better-than-average -e¤ect (i.e., interpersonal optimism); and overprecision, which is about the tendency of people to be overly con…dent about the accuracy of their forecasts. This paper focuses on the …rst of these, but instead of term "overestimation" (or "underestimation"), we use term "optimism" (or "pessimism"). 2 See also Hayashi (1985) , Pistaferri (2001) and Kaufman and Pistaferri (2009), who evaluate the sensitivity of consumption to income shocks using elicited expectations data, as well as Manski (2004) and Jappelli and Pistaferri (2010) , who review the empirical literature on the use of subjective expectations data from various angles. There also is an established strand in the literature that evaluates the rationality of survey expectations (but that do not typically link them to behavior; see Souleles 2004 , Section 1, for a review) and that studies how income expectations are related to subsequent realizations (see Dominitz 1998 and Das and Van Soest 1999). 3 Puri and Robinson document that their measure of optimism correlates positively with the balance payment habits of the U.S. credit card holders. This is an important prior result argued that both behavioral biases and low debt literacy might be related to household overindebtedness and to the recent problems in the markets for consumer credit and mortgages (Inderst 2008, Lusardi and Tufano 2009, Stango and Zinman 2009; see also Campbell, Jackson, Madrian and Tufano 2011).
To propose that households accumulate too much debt is at odds with the standard economic view on consumption and borrowing behaviour. The large and growing literature on consumption typically postulates that households use unsecured (Sullivan 2008 ) and secured (Hurst and Sta¤ord 2004) debt to smooth and boost their consumption (see also Alessie and Lusardi 1997 and Mian and Su… 2011) or that they are unable to borrow as much as they need (see, e.g., Zeldes 1989 and the reviews by Jappelli and Pistaferri 2010 and Attanasio and Weber 2010). 4 The recent analyses of overindebtedness and behavioral biases in the market for debt question the view that these are the only mechanisms at work, but the evidence that backs the alternative views is still limited.
Our data come from Finland, takes the form of a rotating panel and cover a large number of households over a 15-year period from 1994 to 2009. These data are particularly convenient for our purposes: First, the data are nationally representative and allow us to measure how households'…nancial expectations are related to the subsequent outcomes at the level of individuals (households).
We can thus use the di¤erence between the two as a direct indicator of the size and nature of households' forecast errors. The survey questions on which our analysis relies are nearly identical to those studied by Souleles (2004) , underlying the Index of Consumer Sentiment in the U.S. Second, unlike the other data sets available to date, the Finnish data allow us to link the forecast errors to on which we build and that we try to generalize. We ask, in particular, if and how this …nding can be generalized to other institutional environments and dimensions of household borrowing behavior, such as having too much debt (overindebtedness). 4 Other means to smooth consumption are running down savings and resorting to various self-insurance mechanisms, such as intra-family transfers and postponing the purchase of durable goods, and/or reliance on government support programs and unemployment bene…ts; see Sullivan (2008) and Jappelli and Pistaferri (2010) for references that study these. Our main …ndings can be summarized as follows:
First, consistent with the earlier U.S. evidence (Souleles 2004; Puri and Robinson 2007), we …nd that household expectations are, in general, ine¢ cient and vary systematically with the observables. We …nd, moreover, that after conditioning ‡exibly on age, cohort and time e¤ects (as well as on a number of demographic variables), having more education is inversely related with making optimistic forecast errors. Unlike the prior studies, we document that the e¤ect is robust to controlling for the (past) level of and contemporaneous shocks to disposable income, as well as for variation in regional housing prices. This …nding suggests, but does not prove conclusively, that more education makes people less prone to make optimistic forecasts ex ante.
Second, we …nd that households that make the greatest optimistic forecast errors are most indebted and most likely to report that they are overindebted (and have other problems with their debts and bills). These results, too, are robust to controlling ‡exibly for age, cohort and time e¤ects and for the contemporaneous shocks in disposable income. The results support neither the standard view on households'limited access to debt nor use of debt as a safety net (for consumption smoothing). However, our …ndings square nicely with the results of Puri and Robinson (2007) , who show that extreme optimism covaries positively with non-prudent economic behaviour. They also complement the prior studies which suggest that behavioral biases in the market for debt may be empirically important.
This paper also takes a look at the sources of optimistic expectational errors.
We do so by examining whether there is something special in how those making optimistic forecast errors update their (…nancial) expectations. In spirit of the recent literature on consumer inattentiveness (see, e.g., Reiss 2006), we focus on the possibility that those who make the largest optimistic forecast errors are less attentive to the errors than others when they form their expectations.
Clearly, this is a …rst step only, as a complete characterization of the sources of household optimism calls for more detailed data than appears to be currently available. We can, however, show that households are not inattentive to past forecast errors. In particular, we …nd that the probability that a household expects a better (worse) development over a subsequent period is lower for the households for whom the forecast error indicates optimism (pessimism). This relation is consistent with households adjusting their expectations and reacting to past forecast errors. However, this adjustment is found to be asymmetric:
Households that make most optimistic errors update their expectations less than those who make pessimistic forecast errors of similar magnitude.
Taken together, our …ndings portray an elementary process via which optimism may be at work in the market for household debt: Households that make most optimistic forecast errors apparently believe that their errors call for smaller expectational adjustments than the errors of those households that make pessimistic errors of similar magnitude. This asymmetry is consistent with the former being at risk of pursuing non-prudent borrowing behaviour and accumulating gradually greater but potentially unsustainable levels of debt. This, in turn, is line with the most optimistic households reporting that they are overindebted. This behavioral process may sound overly simplistic to many, but seems to have been overlooked in the empirical literature on household debt market behaviour so far. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide a brief review of the related literature. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 analyses the link between households' forecast errors and borrowing behaviour. Section 5 then studies how attentive households are to the forecast errors. Section 6 o¤ers concluding remarks.
Related analyses
This paper stands at the cross-road of two related, but distinct strands of economic and …nance literatures. 5 Taking each of them in turn:
First, there is a small but growing strand in the empirical economic and …nance literature on the behavioral consequences of households' expectational biases and errors. A particular challenge that the analyses in this strand face is that there are only few data sets that allow one to measure both expectations and their subsequent realizations simultaneously with economic outcomes/choices at the level of individuals (or households). 6 The most prominent prior studies from our perspective that have been able to overcome this data challange are those mentioned at the beginning, Souleles (2004) and Puri and Robinson (2007) .
The paper by Souleles uses the panel dimension of the Michigan Survey of
Consumer Attitudes and Behaviour (CAB) to measure consumers'expectations of how their …nancial situation develops and the subsequent realizations. Using these data, he shows that households'forecast errors are correlated with their demographics and thus that they are (ex post) biased. Besides assessing the 5 To draw lines between the di¤erent strands in the literature is always a bit arbitrary. For example, there is a strand that examines macroeconomic expectations of households and their aggregate implications; see, e.g., Carroll (2003), Branch (2007) , and Lanne, Luoma, and Luoto (2009). There is also a growing literature that links biased decision inputs (such as timeinconsistent / present-biased preferences) to subsequent economic and …nancial behaviour; see Ashraf, Karlan and Yin (2006) and Meir and Sprenger (2010) for prominent examples. 6 It is important to note that this means that the data requirement for these studies are more stringent than that faced by the traditional studies that have focused on the accuracy of subjective expectations. To be able to study behavioral consequencies of expectational biases, one has to be able i) to measure how expectations di¤er from the subsequent realizations and then ii) to link the (potential) expectational errors to behavior or choices. See also Jappelli and Pistaferri (2010) , who refer to the same challenge. 6 rationality of household expectations, Souleles evaluates whether the consumer sentiment and expectational questions of the CAB survey are useful in predicting household spending. Because the CAB survey provides limited data on spending, Souleles also uses data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey. When combined with a two-step, two-sample estimation strategy, this allows him to link the forecasts and forecast errors to household-level spending data. One of the most interesting …ndings that this strategy generates is that optimistic forecast errors (that is, negative innovations to income and …nancial position) are negatively related to consumption. Our analysis uses closely related measures of forecast errors, but unlike Souleles, we study household borrowing and can link the errors to it without an intermediate estimation step. Puri and Robinson (2007) solve the data challenge in a di¤erent way. They use the Survey of Consumer Finance and a di¤erence between self-reported life expectancy and statistical life tables to construct a measure of consumer optimism. Using this measure, they document that besides heterogeneity in the degree of optimism, there is a negative relation between holding extremely optimistic views and prudent choices, such as saving, long-term planning and non-smoking. We build directly on Puri and Robinson's analysis by making a distinction between moderate and large expectational errors. However, our analysis di¤ers from theirs in two ways: On the one hand, we can construct a more direct measure for expectational errors and study how the errors are related to subsequent expectations formation. On the other hand, we focus on households'borrowing behaviour and overindebtedness, which is a domain that their analysis does not cover. 7 Second, our paper is related to analyses of debt illiteracy, overindebtedness 7 Puri and Robinson …nd, in particular, that their measure of optimism correlates positively with the balance payment habits of the U.S. credit card holders. To obtain this result, they use as a dependent variable a dummy that is equal to one if the respondent reports in a survey question that they pay their credit card balances in full. We have matched to the IDS data a number of macroeconomic variables, such as the growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP), in ‡ation, unemployment, stock and regional housing prices, and interest rates. The descriptive statistics of the IDS variables and macrovariables used in our empirical analysis 8 The sampling scheme overweights entrepreneurs and high-income households. 9 are presented in Appendix A.
Measuring expectations and forecast errors 4.1 Expectations and realizations
To be able to quantify the nature and size of households' forecast errors (and their systematic expectational biases, if any), we need a measure for household i's …nancial expectation for year t and the subsequent realization. Our measures of these key quantities are based on the following two questions, asked in the survey component of the IDS:
Expectation, E itjt 1 , is derived from the …rst of the two surveys in which household i participates. It is based on question "How do you think that the …nancial situation of your household develops during the next 12 months (or during year t)? ". The following response categories are allowed: "1 = is clearly better ", "2 = is somewhat better ", "3 = stays about the same", "4 = is somewhat worse", and "5 = is clearly worse". The question refers to year t, but was asked in the survey that primarily concerns year t 1:
Actual outcome, A it , is derived from the second of the two surveys (reinterview) in which i participates. It is based on question "How do you think that the …nancial situation of your household developed in year t? ". It allows the same response categories as the expectation question. The question refers to year t and was asked in the survey that primarily deals with year t. 9 We stress two aspects of these questions: First, the question on which E itjt 1 is based asks about the future development of household i's economic and …nancial position. Its wording and allowed categories match exactly with those of A it , which measures the corresponding realization one year later. These questions are nearly identical to those used by Souleles (2004) to examine the development of the …nancial condition of U.S. households and the households'expectations about it (i.e., his variables QF P r and QF P e ). Like Souleles, we use the match between the two questions to analyse in-sample forecast errors at the level of households. Second, it is important to note that while households show up in the data for two consecutive periods, we can match E itjt 1 with A it only for the latter period. This timing means, in particular, that we can compute only one forecast error per household. While this may sound restrictive at …rst, we can fortunately do so for a large number of households over a 15-year period. Table 1 displays a cross-tabulation of E itjt 1 and A it . The entries are the number of observations falling in each cell and the associated cell probabilities.
The table shows that a bit more than half of the observations in the data can be found from the diagonal cells, the sum of diagonal cell probabilities being 56.3%. Moreover, 35.2% of the observations are in the cells that are adjacent to the diagonal. These patterns indicate that expectations are strongly, but not perfectly, correlated with the subsequent outcomes.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
We can also infer from Table 1 that, on average, A it vary around E itjt 1 symmetrically. Below the diagonal the sum of the cell probabilities is 22.0% and above it, the sum is 21.8%. These numbers are very close to each other, indicating that on average, the Finnish households have neither made optimistic nor pessimistic forecast errors over the sample period. The cell probabilities of the table also indicate that the fraction of households who appear to make large forecast errors (in either direction) is moderate but not negligible. For example, out of those who expect that their …nancial situation does not worsen (i.e., those for whom E itjt 1 = 1; 2 or 3), around 12.8% …nd that it actually worsens (i.e., A it = 4 or 5).
Measuring forecast errors
The matched pair of questions, E itjt 1 and A it , allows us to calculate a forecast error for each household. We consider two complementary measures, which combine insights both from Souleles (2004) and Puri and Robinson (2007) : Like Souleles, we use the di¤erence between E itjt 1 and A it as the basis of our forecast errors (see, e.g., his "F P measure). However, instead of just focusing on the absolute value of the di¤erence, we follow Puri and Robinson and explicitly consider the qualitative nature of the forecast errors, such as whether the expectations and realizations imply mild or extreme optimism or non-prudent expectations formation.
Our …rst measure, denoted F E1 it ; allows for 5 categories. They are clearly
, and clearly optimistic forecast error (F E1 it = 5 if
The logic of this measure is that it allows characterizing qualitatively whether the expectation of household i about the development of its …nancial situation matches with its ex post view of the eventual realization. The optimistic (pessimistic) errors refer to the cases in which a household experiences a negative (positive) surprise relative to what it expected. For example, a household is said to make a clearly optimistic forecast error if it initially thought that its …nancial situation would clearly improve, but if it in the end stayed about the same or worsened. An example of a smaller optimistic error would be the case in which a household initially thought that its …nancial situation would improve somewhat, but in which it in the end stayed about the same.
It is also worth pointing out two features about the middle category (F E1 it = 3). First, it correponds to the case of the expectation matching with the subsequent perceived realization. When that is the case, a household can be said to have hold a realistic expectation of how its …nancial situation develops. Second, the measure is symmetric around the middle category: The error is allowed to be two-sided and of the "same magnitude" on the both sides of the middle category. That is, for each category on the pessimistic side there is a corresponding category on the optimistic forecast error side. We make use of this property when we study, e.g., whether households react symmetrically to forecast errors when forming an expectation for a subsequent period.
Our second measure, denoted F E2 it , is asymmetric and has four categories. Besides allowing for separate categories for those making pessimistic or no forecast errors, this measure distinguishes qualitatively between prudent and non-prudent optimistic errors. The categories of F E2 it are pessimistic
, and non-prudentially optimistic forecast error
The prudentially optimistic forecast error refers to those cases in which a household experiences a negative surprise relative to what it expected but, despite of that happening, its …nancial situation does not actually worsen. A household is said to experience a non-prudent forecast error if it both experiences a negative surprise relative to what it expected and if its …nancial situation actually worsens. and their variability. We also control for regional housing prices, which may boost home equity-based borrowing and consumption (Mian and Sud… 2011).
Our motivation to focus on the association of forecast errors with education is two fold. First, the association is of intrinsic interest, as it can be indicative of education in ‡uencing how prone people are to make ine¢ cient forecasts ex ante.
It can also be indicative of certain educational categories su¤ering disproportionately from unfavorable shocks (e.g., due to unexpected skill-biased change).
Second, the prior analyses of Souleles (2004) To reassess how formal education is associated with forecast errors, we include separate dummies for secondary-level education, lower-degree tertiary education, higher-degree tertiary education, and doctoral education. 12 This results in a more ‡exible speci…cation than that used in the preceding studies and allows a detailed look at how the various categories of education covary with forecast errors. [Insert Table 3 about here]
As we see it, the above …ndings are quite in line with Souleles (2004) and
sharpen the picture somewhat. They can be reconciled with two views: On the one hand, despite our extensive control vectors, we cannot rule out that people with better education have bene…ted disproportionately from favorable shocks, such as unexpected skill-biased technical change and the associated structural change in the business sector, that characterize the sample period. It is, however, important to note that, our results are robust not only to regional …xed e¤ects and regional housing price development (which re ‡ect structural change), but also to controlling for the past level of and unpredictable change in disposable income (as can be seen from the third columns of Table 3 ). This casts doubt on the proposition that the documented e¤ects of education are solely due to a series of unexpected skill-biased income surprises (or equivalent ex post shocks). The alternative view of the above results is that getting more education has made people less prone to make (overly) optimistic forecasts ex ante.
Forecast errors and household borrowing behaviour
The …ndings in the earlier literature suggest that households that are prone to make forecast errors behave di¤erently (Souleles 2004 ) and, perhaps, nonprudently (Puri and Robinson 2007) . In this section, we aim at expanding the earlier analysis and focus on two main questions. First, do households who make forecast errors borrow more? In particular, are those making bigger forecast errors more indebted? Second, are error prone households more likely to report being overindebted?
Household borrowing and indebtedness
We study the relation of forecast errors with household borrowing and indebtedness in two ways. First, we make use of the fact that we have data on the total amount of outstanding loans that household i has for two consecutive periods.
The debt measure available in the IDS, D it ; is comprehensive, as it includes all household borrowing, including mortgages, consumer credit, student loans and loans taken up for the purpose of acquiring income. We can therefore calculate a change in the total amount of outstanding loans. In spirit of Sullivan (2008;  see his eq. 1), this allows us to link the instantaneous behavioral response of household i (i.e., whether it borrows more or pays back its debts) to forecast errors (F E1 it and F E2 it ). Second, we study the level of indebtedness and how it is related to F E1 it and F E2 it . The results of the two panels of the table show, perhaps a bit surprisingly, that those not making forecast errors borrow less (or pay more back their debts) than the households who make moderately pessimistic forecast errors. The estimates vary a bit across the columns, but in general, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coe¢ cients of the pessimistic forecast error categories are equal to the corresponding coe¢ cients of the optimistic forecast error categories.
These results do not change materially even if we exclude from the estimating sample the households for whom the change in D it is zero.
The result is in line with the view that borrowing correlates with (unanticipated) income changes. It is harder to determine conclusively why the response to optimistic and pessimistic errors is similar: An interpretation of the symmetry that would be consistent with the standard consumption smoothing view is that the negative shocks, which lead to optimistic errors, are transitory and call for smoothing (via use of debt; Sullivan 2008) and that the positive shocks, which lead to pessimistic errors, are more permanent, and enhance households'
borrowing capacity (see, e.g., Japelli and Pistaferri 2010). However, as we demonstrate below, other dimensions of our data suggest that this interpretation is problematic.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
To study household indebtedness, we divide D it by the disposable income of 20 household i, calculated as the simple average of disposable income in t 1 and t (i.e., over those two consecutive periods over which each household is observed in our data). This gives us a debt-to-income ratio, D_I it , which is a measure of how indebted a household is. Table 4 .
[Insert Table 5 Two further aspects about the above …ndings are worth noting. The …rst is that they square nicely with the results of Puri and Robinson (2007), who …nd that extreme, as opposed to moderate, optimism covaries positively with non-prudent economic behaviour. Our results suggest that the notion generalizes to other institutional environments and decision-making contexts and, in particular, to the market for household debt. The second thing to note is that our results are robust to controlling for the past level of and unexpected change in disposable income (as noted above). This aspect is important, as it suggests that the documented association of optimism with greater indebtedness is not just due to ex post income surprises. Moreover, the results are robust to controlling for regional housing prices, which suggest that the documented association cannot solely be explained by raising home prices and home equity-based borrowing (Mian and Su… 2011).
Panel B shows that those making non-prudentially optimistic forecast errors do not di¤er signi…cantly from those making prudentially optimistic forecast errors. However, households in both of these optimistic categories di¤er from households making pessimistic errors, because the latter are less indebted.
The above results are robust to a number of alternative speci…cations. First, the OLS results are robust to conditioning on D_I it > 0: Second, the results of a series of unreported quantile regressions show that households making optimistic forecast errors are more indebted than those making pessimistic forecast errors. This results suggests that the main …ndings of Table 5 are not due to outliers. Finally, the results remain intact if we replace D_I it by a debt-paymentto-income ratio, which is de…ned here as the mortgage-service-to-income ratio (incl. both interest expenses and instalments) and which is a measure recently used by Johnson and Li (2010) to identify households that may face borrowing constraints. In particular, we …nd that households that make optimistic forecast errors have greater debt service ratios than the households who make no errors or who make pessimistic errors. Moreover, households that make clearly optimistic forecast errors have higher debt service ratios than those who make moderately optimistic errors. In sum, the alternative speci…cations echo our earlier results and support the view that greater optimism is associated with greater indebtedness.
Overindebtedness
Our results for household indebtedness suggest that extreme optimism, as cap- In search of an established practise, we use as our primary dependent variable in this subsection a dummy that is equal to one if a household reports in the survey component of the IDS the perception that it has too much debt, and is zero otherwise. The measure is similar in spirit to that used by Lusardi and Tufano (2009), but it is comforting to report already here that the results are not sensitive to this particular choice of the dependent variable (more on this below). Table 4 .
[Insert Table 6 about here]
The results are robust across the columns of Table 6 and provide us with the key …nding that households that make clearly optimistic forecast errors are more likely than others to report that they are overindebted. The result is asymmetric, as there is no corresponding e¤ect on the pessimistic side. Interestingly, there is symmetry if we look at moderately pessimistic and optimistic errors: The marginal e¤ects are of equal magnitude for the households who make such (smaller) forecast errors. The results reported for the households making non-prudentially optimistic forecast errors in Panel B con…rm these …ndings.
In sum, the results support the view that extreme optimism covaries positively with non-prudent, unsustainable levels of debt.
The results of Table 6 are robust to a number of alternative indicators of overindebtedness. First, the results are similar if we use as the dependent variable an indicator that is equal to one if a household reports (in the survey component of the IDS) that it has had to agree with its bank to reschedule its debt payments, and that is zero otherwise. Second, the results do no change if we use instead an indicator that is equal to one if a household reports that it has had problems in paying its regular (utility etc.) bills. Third, the results remain intact if the dependent variable is an indicator that is equal to one if a household reports that it has had problems in meeting its regular mortgage payments.
Finally, the qualitative results are similar if the dependent variable is an indicator that is equal to one if a household has had to resort discretionary municipal supplementary bene…ts (i.e., social income assistance). Taken together, all these auxiliary analyses support the view that making large optimistic forecast errors covaries positively with unsustainable levels of debt.
Inattention and formation of expectations
In this section, we make use of the short panel aspect of the IDS data to examine how households update their …nancial expectations in the face of forecast errors.
This analysis provides us with a way to examine whether there is something special in how those making optimistic forecast errors update their (…nancial) expectations. In spirit of the recent literature on consumer inattentiveness and following Reiss (2006) , we focus on the possibility that those who make the largest optimistic forecast errors are less attentive to the errors than others when they form their expectations.
To this end, we use data on E itjt 1 and E it+1jt and calculate a categorial variable that indicates whether, and if so how, household i changes its expectation of its …nancial condition: The dependent variable that we use in this subsection takes value 3 if the household in the re-interview of the second survey qualitatively expects a better …nancial development during period t+1 than it did in the …rst survey for period t; it takes value 2 if there is no change in the expectation; and it takes value 1 if the household in the re-interview expects a worse development than it did in the …rst survey. 13 1 3 More formally, our measure for the change in expectations, F _ch it ; allows for 3 categories as follows:
We run O-probit regressions which relate households' changes in their …nancial expectations (the dependent variable) to their (past) forecast errors, as measured by the categories of F E1 it and F E2 it . Table 7 reports the marginal e¤ects of these models. Panels A and B give the results for F E1 it and F E2 it , respectively, and the R.H.S. speci…cations of the three columns in them match with those reported in Table 4 .
The results of both panels show that households are not inattentive to past forecast errors. In particular, we …nd that the probability that a household expects a better (worse) development over the subsequent period than it did in the …rst survey is lower for the households for whom the forecast error indicates optimism (pessimism). This result is intuitive and consistent with households adjusting their expectations and reacting to past errors. However, adjustment is done in a surprising way: Households that make clearly optimistic errors update their expectations much less than those who make pessimistic forecast errors of similar magnitude. This means that adjustment is asymmetric. 14 Table 7 about here]
[Insert
There are at least two (not necessarily mutually exclusive) ways to interpret the asymmetry. First, some income shocks are (more) permanent whereas others are transitory, as the large literature on consumption responses to income changes suggests (Japelli and Pistaferri 2010). Our …nding is consistent with rational updating if it is combined with the view that negative shocks, which lead to optimistic forecast errors, are less transitory than the positive shocks.
The literature provides limited direct evidence on this, though there is some evidence, such as the documented (long-term) scarring e¤ects of unemployment and job losses (see, e.g., Arulampalam, Booth and Taylor 2000, Gregg 2001, Huttunen, Møen, and Salvanes 2011) and the …ndings for the income e¤ects of disability, which suggest the opposite. Second, the asymmetry in expectations adjustment that we …nd is consistent with the view that households are not su¢ ciently attentive (i.e., they underreact) to optimistic forecast errors. 15 We cautiously lean on the latter interpretation, because the …rst is harder to reconcile with the other …ndings of this paper. Indeed, the asymmetry allows putting our results into a unifying context: First, it seems that households that make clearly optimistic errors believe that their forecast errors are less persistent and call for smaller expectational adjustments than the errors of those households that make pessimistic errors of similar magnitude. This asymmetry is consistent with the former being at risk of pursuing non-prudent borrowing behaviour and carrying greater levels of debt (e.g. not reducing debt). Over time, this kind of behaviour is likely to lead to undesired accumulation of debt. 16 Second, the …nding of asymmetric adjustment is in line with the view that households who make clearly optimistic forecast errors are more likely than others to report that they are overindebted. Such reports square with the view that some households adjust their expectations systematically too little, leading -perhaps gradually -to excessive debt loads. 17
Conclusions
While the view that households may be subject to behavioural biases and have limited cognitive capacity to make optimal borrowing decisions is not new (see Campbell et al. 2011 for a recent review), we think that taken together, the …ndings of this paper portray a novel picture of optimism in the market for household debt: Households that make clearly optimistic errors apparently believe that their forecast errors call for smaller expectational adjustments than the errors of those households that make pessimistic errors of similar magnitude. This asymmetry in the adjustment of expectations is consistent with the former being at risk of accumulating greater, imprudent levels of debt. This process is a potential explanation for the …nding that households who make clearly optimistic errors are most likely to report that they are overindebted.
Behavioral consequences and sources of household optimism and forecast errors are not yet well-understood. Our analysis is a …rst step only, as their complete characterization calls for more detailed data than appears to be currently available. We hope, however, that we have laid ground for subsequent research e¤orts in this domain. Can similar asymmetric patterns in expecta- This table reports the cross-tabulation of households' expectations (E it|t-1 ) on the development of their financial situation over the next 12 months (year t) and the actual outcomes (A it ), as assessed a year later. The categories take on values "1 = clearly towards better", "2 = somewhat towards better", "3 = stays/stayed about the same", "4 = somewhat towards worse", and "5 = clearly towards worse". The cell entries are the number of households and the corresponding cell probabilities. The data are from the Statistics Finland's Income Distribution Statistics (1994-2009). (Panel B) . The forecast errors measured by FE1 take on values "1 = clearly pessimistic", "2 = moderately pessimistic", "3 = no error", "4 = moderately optimistic", and "5 = clearly optimistic". The forecast errors measured by FE2 take on values"1 = pessimistic", "2 = no error", "3 = prudentially optimistic", and "4 = non-prudentially optimistic". Standard errors are clustered at the region-year level and reported in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. The data are from the Statistics Finland's Income Distribution Statistics (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) Secondary-level education 0.002* 0.002* 0.002 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Lower-degree tertiary education 0.003* 0.003* 0.002* (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Higher-degree tertiary education 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.006*** (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) Doctoral education 0.008** 0.008** 0.007* (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) Male 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003** (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Secondary-level education 0.005* 0.005* 0.004 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) Lower-degree tertiary education 0.007* 0.007* 0.006* (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) Higher-degree tertiary education 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.014*** (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) Doctoral education 0.020** 0.020** 0.017* (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) Male 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007** (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) Secondary-level education -0.005* -0.005* -0.004 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) Lower-degree tertiary education -0.006* -0.006* -0.006* (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) Higher-degree tertiary education -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.013*** (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) Doctoral education -0.018** -0.018** -0.016* (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) Male -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.006** (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) Secondary-level education -0.002* -0.002* -0.002 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Lower-degree tertiary education -0.003* -0.003* -0.003* (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Higher-degree tertiary education -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.006*** (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) Doctoral education -0.008** -0.008** -0.008* (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) Male -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003** (0.001) (0 
